Insider betting: Will Trump declare a ceasefire by the end of April?

Developments in the recent week of the U.S.-Iran conflict situation are escalating continuously.

The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division canceled its rotation of the “Joint Readiness Training Center,” the U.S. 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade transported aircraft by air instead of normal sealift to increase airlift capacity, U.S. military bases in the Middle East increased their blood bank reserves by 500%, and the largest overseas U.S. Department of Defense hospital in the world—the Landesstüür Medical Center in Germany—paused some civilian services.

The last time this kind of combination of moves was deployed was on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

At a time when tensions were at their highest, Trump suddenly posted that both sides had “a very, very good and highly productive conversation,” and announced that the U.S. would pause military strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure for five days. In the early hours of March 27 Beijing time, Trump posted again saying the pause on strikes would be extended through April 6.

This contrast between these objective facts and what Trump said adds considerable difficulty to analysis of the situation.

But beyond these public statements, there is another information channel known as “prediction markets,” attempting to translate the flow of capital into interpretations of how events unfold, offering the world a new perspective on information analysis.

And in recent days, the money has started to concentrate in the same direction.

Multiple insider accounts “pick a side” on an imminent ceasefire

In prediction markets, there is a trading event created only 3 weeks ago, with trading volume exceeding $50 million: “Will the U.S. and Iran ceasefire by ___ Month ___ Day.” If two people who hold different views about this market can reach agreement on “probability,” then matched trades will form along with the corresponding event occurrence probability.

The market’s definition of “ceasefire” is very clear: both sides publicly announce a stop to direct military hostilities. Combined with the escalating conflict situation described earlier, most people would consider a ceasefire a low-probability event with little hope—especially when there are signs that every military indicator is moving upward.

And as the public thinks, as of now the probability of a ceasefire by April 30 is around 38%, while the probability of a ceasefire by March 31 is only 5%. Even many people think this probability should be lower—those who “overestimate” the likelihood of a ceasefire, 80% of the time, are gamblers who come “to try their luck” without even checking the latest news headlines.

But among these “gamblers,” there have appeared six accounts that look highly suspicious. Their total profits of $1.8 million all came from accurately predicting the time nodes during 2025 for “U.S.-Israel strikes against Iran” and the “Israel-Hamas ceasefire,” as well as the outbreak time of this Iran conflict and the assassination of Iran’s former top leader Khamenei

This string of seemingly perfect predictions is not their only shared trait. As of March 27, they had cumulatively put in $285,000 with conviction that the U.S. and Iran would ceasefire before April 30, including $185,000 placed in the market of “the U.S. and Iran ceasefire before March 31.”

If these six accounts can truly “foresee the future,” then we can, in reverse, use “knowing ahead of time there will be a ceasefire” to infer the stances of both sides.

Why Iran would want a ceasefire

Right now may be the moment when Iran has its strongest negotiation position and the most bargaining chips in this war: the Strait of Hormuz blockade pushed global oil prices higher, no countries other than the U.S. and Israel are directly taking part in strikes, and the anti-resistance narrative and patriotic sentiment brought by the new leadership have rallied the public.

Conversely, if fighting continues, a series of measures—including the gradual shift of pro-U.S. Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the continued attrition of Iran’s military capabilities, and the development of alternative routes to the Strait of Hormuz—will cause Iran to lose its dominant position at the negotiating table.

At this point, there is an extremely sharp issue that must be raised: on the eve of the outbreak of this war, the U.S. and Iran were holding negotiations in Geneva, and at that time the progress was described by everyone involved as “productive,” even “within reach of a historic agreement.”

However, while negotiations between the U.S. and Israel were still ongoing, the U.S. launched a sudden attack on Iran. With precedent like this in mind, how can Iran trust that the U.S. will honor its ceasefire commitment?

This comes down to the nature of a ceasefire itself: for Iran, a ceasefire is not a matter of trust, but a matter of calculating interests. If the U.S. were to tear up the agreement again after it is reached, Iran would further entrench the narrative on the international stage of “the U.S. reneging on its word.” If the agreement is honored, Iran locks in the most favorable negotiation outcome it has at this moment.

That also explains why, although Iran previously said publicly it would “not negotiate,” it kept information flowing through multiple backchannels and even specifically put forward counterproposals. Public statements are for domestic audiences; actual engagement is about securing the best possible exit conditions.

In addition, Iran’s proxy network has suffered problems in this round of war such as organizational fragmentation and ammunition depletion. Combined with the fact that its domestic economy was already nearing collapse before the war began (the Iranian rial has depreciated by nearly 90% compared with 2018), cutting losses and taking what they can get may be their best solution right now.

The U.S., farthest from the battlefield, wants a ceasefire most

Nearly a month after the war began, the S&P 500 has fallen steadily from pre-war levels, the Dow has closed lower for four straight weeks, and it has recorded its longest losing streak in three years; gasoline prices have surged from $2.98 pre-war to $3.98, up more than 30% in three weeks; 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rates have risen by a full half percentage point; and Goldman Sachs has raised its recession probability to 30%.

In the short term, these core data points have limited impact on ordinary Americans, but they are deadly for Trump—because the stock market and WTI oil prices are key indicators of his governing record.

At this moment, the most ideal tool for the U.S. government—the Strategic Petroleum Reserve—is also seeing its effectiveness sharply reduced due to the aging of its facilities. Since the system was designed with a service life of only 25 years after it was built following the 1975 oil crisis, its actual sustainable release capacity may be only about half of what official publicity claims, or even lower.

More critically, extracting crude oil further dissolves the internal structure of the salt caverns, meaning that large-scale release itself would also accelerate system aging. In narrative terms, using this card can indeed help Trump stabilize market sentiment in the short run; but if the front line drags on, the disadvantages of this countermeasure could show up on the K-line chart in the form of a sharp spike in oil prices.

Besides financial data, U.S. domestic politics is also a factor Trump must weigh in this round of war. When the Iraq War began, Bush’s approval rating was as high as 72%; when the Afghanistan War began, his approval rating exceeded 90%.

But in the first day after the current war began, Trump’s approval rating was below 40%. Even the classic “rally-around-the-flag” effect in political science—when presidential approval rebounds after war breaks out—did not appear in this campaign of strikes. As of March 25, Trump’s overall approval rating had fallen to 36%, the lowest level since his second term.

On top of that, given his campaign promise of “No New Wars,” Trump’s current performance on the American political stage has not only jeopardized his core team’s prospects in the midterm elections later this year, but is also eroding the GOP’s overall voice ahead of the 2028 presidential election.

On the other hand, Trump has also set himself a hard deadline of May 14. Because he needs to “stay in Washington to handle ongoing combat operations,” he postponed his planned trip to China next week, and yesterday publicly stated that the trip will be extended to May 14.

It is foreseeable that Trump needs to go to Beijing in the identity of a “winner,” not a “president trapped by the Middle East quagmire.”

Everything is changing, but TACO won’t change

Right now, there is a term used specifically to describe Trump suddenly announcing good news after applying maximum pressure: TACO. Its full name is Trump Always Chickens Out (Trump always backs down at the last moment).

However, given the current tense geopolitical situation in the Middle East, many people believe he will not TACO, and even less believe he could successfully convince Iran to agree to a ceasefire.

Three months ago, if someone told you that Trump would bring Venezuela’s President Maduro back to a U.S. court like catching a chicken, take Greenland as a tariff bargaining chip against European allies at the Davos World Economic Forum, threaten them, and then, during negotiations with Iran, have its top leader blown up—

These events, once thought to have less than a 1% probability, have occurred. And what we are watching now is the future: whether the low-probability U.S.-Iran ceasefire TACO that is supposed to happen within the next month will actually play out as scheduled.